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NOTES
Marital Status Classifications: Protecting
Homosexual and Heterosexual
Cohabitors
When it is determined that the common law or the judge-made law
is unjust or out of step with the times, we should have no reluc-
tance to change it .... The law is not, nor should it be, static. It
must keep pace with changes in our society since it was never in-
tended... to be cast in iron.1
Introduction
Homosexuals2 face a unique set of obstacles3 which prevents their
enjoyment of the same civil rights afforded heterosexuals. One such ob-
stacle is the ban in every state on marriage by homosexual couples,4
which denies to homosexuals the legal, financial, social, and psychologi-
cal benefits and privileges afforded to married heterosexuals. 5 Homosex-
1. Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 64, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1983).
2. Throughout this Note, the term "homosexual" will be used to. denote phale and female
homosexuals.
3. See infra notes 100-116 and accompanying text.
4. M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976) (recognizing the national ban on
marriage); accord B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974) (holding that a marriage
between two persons of the same sex is a nullity and forms no legal relationship); Singer v.
Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.
1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972).
5. Marriage affords the participants:
[P]referential tax treatment, a right of action with regard to a [spouse's] fatal acci-
dent[,]... social security benefits, and protection of the law of intestate succession.
Moreover, the married couple benefits from innumerable nongovernmental benefits
such as employee family health care, group insurance, lower automobile insurance,
family membership in various organizations, and the ability to hold real estate by the
entirety. Beyond these legal and economic benefits, marriage is... psychologically
beneficial to the participants by strengthening the stability, emotional health and so-
cietal respectability of the relationship.
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United
States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874 (1979). See also Note, The Right of an Unmarried Cohabi-
tant to an Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in California, 15 PAC. L.J. 925
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Emotional Distress]; Note, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Consti-
tutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979) [hereinafter Note,
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ual couples may not gain the legal rights of marriage which cohabiting6
heterosexuals may gain at any time by marrying.
This denial of rights based on marital status carries constitutional
implications: equal protection of the law is violated when equivalent
groups are treated differently.7 This Note uses the term "marital status
classification" to denote a law which separates persons for disparate
treatment solely on the basis of marital status. Marital status classifica-
tions particularly injure two segments of society: homosexuals and
cohabitors.
This Note discusses the rights currently afforded to homosexual
cohabitors and focuses particularly on the various approaches available
to homosexual couples to enforce these rights. Part One discusses Hin-
man v. Department of Personnel,8 a California case in which a homosex-
ual couple was denied employment benefits under a statute based on a
marital status classification. Part Two focuses on the Equal Protection
Clause,9 the rights presently afforded to homosexual cohabitors, and the
current legislative trends regarding homosexual cohabitors. Part Three
applies an equal protection analysis to the facts in Hinman, compares
homosexual cohabitors to heterosexual cohabitors, and questions the
utility and propriety of legislative classifications based on marital status.
This Note concludes with a proposal to facilitate judicial protection of
the rights of unmarried cohabitors, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
by replacing marital status with a new test to determine the legal signifi-
cance of a couple's relationship. Under this new test, couples able to
demonstrate the stability and significance of their relationship would be
afforded the same legal protection as married couples.
I. The Rights of Homosexuals and Cohabitors and Hinman v.
Department of Personnel
Homosexual cohabitors and heterosexual cohabitors have the same
property rights. Both can establish contractual relationships, such as
contracts of mutual support, 0 or become beneficiaries of insurance poli-
Right to Marry]; Mitchelson, Equal Protection for Unmarried Cohabitors: An Insider's Look at
Marvin v. Marvin, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 283 (1978); Note, The Legality of Homosexual
Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 576 (1973).
6. A cohabitor or cohabitant is "a person steadily living with another under marriage-
like conditions without the good faith belief that he [or she] is legally married." Note, Justify-
ing the Denial of Wrongful Death Action to Cohabitants, 20 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 417, 417 n.2
(1983) [hereinafter Note, Denial of Wrongful Death].
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 520-21, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412; infra notes 163-
165 and accompanying text.
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cies.1 ' Both can be co-owners of real and personal property and own
joint checking accounts. 2 Neither can be arbitrarily discriminated
against in employment on the basis of their sexual orientation.13
However, heterosexuals and homosexuals are treated differently in
regard to personal rights not directly related to property. Heterosexual
cohabitors generally have the right to marry,14 and after living together
over a long period of time, such couples can have their relationship de-
creed a common-law marriage, particularly if they have children.15
Homosexuals cannot marry, 16 nor can their relationships develop into
common-law marriages, regardless of how long they live together. 7 In
addition, homosexuals have less privacy protection than heterosexual
cohabitors. For instance, heterosexual cohabitors' private consensual
sexual relations are protected by the right to privacy,18 while homosexual
relations are not protected.19
11. See, eg., Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412; see infra notes 163-
165 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412; see infra notes 163-
165 and accompanying text.
13. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gay Law Students v. Pacific
Tel. and Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
In 1979, California's Governor issued Executive Order B-54-79, providing in part: "[The]
California Constitution guarantees the inalienable right of privacy for all people ... [and]
government must not single out sexual minorities for harassment or recognize sexual orienta-
tion as a basis for discrimination;... the state government.., shall not discriminate in state
employment against any individual based solely upon the individual's sexual preference." (re-
ported in Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 530 n.10, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419 n.10). However, the
executive order has been narrowly construed by the courts. For instance, the court of appeals
in Hinman held that "nothing in the order.., applies to alleged differences in benefit cover-
ages. [The order applies to discrimination against employees themselves, not their lovers.]
There are no differences in dental benefits given homosexual and heterosexual unmarried state
employees, and thus.... there is... no discrimination at all." 167 Cal. App. 3d at 530, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 419.
14. Note, Right to Marry, supra note 5. See also Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522
P.2d 1187 (1974) (deeming the right to marry a fundamental right).
15. A common-law marriage is one not solemnized in the ordinary way (i.e., non-ceremo-
nial) but created by an agreement to marry, followed by cohabitation. Such marriage requires
a positive mutual agreement-permanent and exclusive of others-to enter into a marriage
relationship, cohabitation sufficient to warrant a fulfillment of the necessary relationship of
man and wife, and an assumption of marital duties and obligations. Marshall v. State, 537
P.2d 423, 429 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
16. See supra note 4.
17. Common-law marriage, by definition, can only occur between those legally capable of
making a marriage contract, thus effectively precluding homosexuals. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 251 (5th ed. 1979). R. ACHTENBERG, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
§ 3.04[1] (1985).
18. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
19. Id. at 2844. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court stated that the right to pri-
vacy, which previously was thought to offer protection to all private consensual relations,
stemmed from an amorphous link between heterosexual sex and procreation and family:
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Homosexual cohabitors, to enforce their rights and to gain access to
government entitlements, have turned to marriage alternatives such as
"adult adoption," 0 wherein one cohabitor adopts the other as his legal
child. Courts have had varied reactions to homosexual adult adoptions,
ranging from support to condemnation. E" A few courts have allowed
adoptions when the participants' motivations were limited to the crea-
tion of a legally binding "family" relationship between two homosexuals.
In In re Adult Anonymous 11,2 the parties' purpose in the adult adoption
was neither insincere nor fraudulent, so the court allowed the adoption. 3
Other courts have reacted negatively to adult adoptions, which they sus-
pect are an attempt to create a pseudo-marriage between homosexuals; 4
such adult adoptions have been termed a "grotesque parody" of a parent-
child relationship. 25 Even if the adult adoption is upheld by a court, it
does not ensure that a homosexual couple will receive the same legal
benefits as a married couple would receive if the statute, like the one in
Hinman, only covers spouses and minor children.
A review of legislation dealing with cohabitors over the past fifteen
years indicates that the legislature may be moving toward more
equivalent treatment of married and unmarried couples. z6 In 1975, Cali-
[N]one of the rights announced in [the right to privacy] cases bears any resemblance
to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is
asserted in this case. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated ....
Id.
20. Adult adoption is a binding and legally recognized family relationship established
when one adult adopts another. In California, an estimated 85 to 90 homosexual adult adop-
tions occur annually. Note, Adult Adoptions: A "New" Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men,
14 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 667, 702 (1984). The government entitlements and benefits flow-
ing from the creation of a family relationship through adult adoption include the following:
(1) it provides inheritance rights; (2) it deems a person next-of-kin for purposes such as gaining
access to information limited to family members; (3) it helps the couple evade housing and
zoning restrictions; (4) it helps the couple gain insurance and unemployment benefits; and
(5) it allows the couple to immigrate into the United States and create a family unit. R.
ACHTENBERG, supra note 17, at § 1.05[2].
21. One court held that a homosexual's adoption of another adult was acceptable solely
for the purpose of preventing the adoptee's disapproving family from invalidating preexisting
property arrangements between the two men. In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous I, 106
Misc. 2d 792, 800, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (1981). Adult adoptions are disallowed if the partici-
pants' motive is to create a "pseudo-marriage." Id.
22. 88 A.D.2d 30, 35, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (1982).
23. Id.
24. In In re Robert Paul P., the court strongly stated that adoption cannot take the place
of marriages, contracts, or wills. 117 Misc. 2d 279, 458 N.Y.S.2d 178, aft'd, 63 N.Y.2d 233,
471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1983).
25. In In re Robert Paul P., the court refused to allow a 57 year old man to adopt his 50
year old lover because it found their actual purpose was to create a pseudo-marriage. Id.
26. See infra notes 26-29. But see Elden v. Sheldon, 164 Cal. App. 3d 745, 210 Cal. Rptr.
755 (1985), where the court of appeals indicated that marriage and cohabitation are not legally
equivalent relationships:
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fornia's Uniform Parentage Act 27 expressly made marital status irrele-
vant to the definition of the legal parent-child relationship and its
accompanying rights. In 1976, California passed the Fair Employment
and Housing Act,28 adding marital status as an unlawful basis for hous-
ing discrimination.2 9
However, homosexual and heterosexual cohabitors still do not have
many rights that married persons possess. For instance, unlike married
persons, homosexual and heterosexual cohabitors cannot state a cause of
action for loss of the companionship of their partner.30 Cohabitors are
denied the tax benefits, social security benefits, group insurance avail-
ability, and lower automobile insurance premiums enjoyed by the mar-
ried. a" Cohabitors are also unprotected by the laws of intestate
succession. They cannot hold property by the entirety in common law
[Marvin] merely held that parties to a meretricious relationship have the same rights
to enforce contracts and to assert their equitable interests in property acquired
through their effort as do other unmarried persons. Other cases have recognized the
limitations of Marvin and have refused to find that a non-marital relationship is the
equivalent of marriage.
Id. at 757 n.4 (citing Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 133 Cal. App. 3d 890, 184 Cal. Rptr. 390
(1982); Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981)).
See generally Note, Denial of Wrongful Death, supra note 6, at 434, recognizing a general trend
toward equating cohabitation and marriage and arguing that obliteration of the marital status
distinction actually lessens cohabitors' freedom of choice: "Liberty is lost when choice is de-
stroyed; choice is destroyed when cohabitation becomes marriage-like because only one type of
relationship remains where two types existed before. Denial of legal equivalence between co-
habitant and spouse is necessary to end the post-Marvin trend [of equating the two]." Id.
27. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986). Another law, the 1969
Family Law Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5100 et seq. (West 1977 & Supp. 1986), was also judi-
cially interpreted so as to lessen the distinction between married and unmarried persons. The
California Supreme Court held that when the Act was drafted in the 1960's, the issue of un-
married cohabitation was not addressed, and thus cohabitors' property settlements cannot be
said to have been purposefully excluded from coverage. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557
P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Because the court could easily have excluded cohabitors
from the Family Law Act, this ruling is consistent with the trend to protect unmarried
cohabitors' rights.
28. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980). Some commentators view this statute as a
tool for further equating treatment of married persons and cohabitors. "Already Marvin is
used to extend legal equivalence between spouse and cohabitant. An innovative court might
also rely on California Government Code section 12955 to further attach legal significance to
cohabitation." Note, Denial of Wrongful Death, supra note 6, at 434. "The cited statute may
represent a policy of equating cohabitation with marriage.., and may be used by a court to
rationalize further expansion." Id. at 434 n.102.
29. A California court of appeals interpreted the Fair Employment and Housing Act to
indicate that there is no legitimate business interest in discriminating on the basis of marital
status or cohabitation. Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 232,
187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982). In Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, 59 Cal. App. 3d
89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976), the court earlier viewed the Act as proclaiming a general policy
statement that California would no longer advocate, at least in the housing realm, marital
status discrimination.
30. See R. ACHTENBERG, supra note 17.
31. Id.
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states;32 nor can they hold community property in community property
states.33 Homosexual and heterosexual cohabitors are not entitled to
their partner's employee health care benefits.34
Hinman v. Department of Personnel35 illustrates the problems en-
countered by homosexual couples attempting to gain the rights and privi-
leges of married couples.36 Boyce Hinman, an employee of the California
Employment Development Department, applied through his prepaid
group dental plan for dental coverage for himself and his cohabiting
lover of twelve years, Larry Beatty.37 The statute providing dental bene-
fits38 limited eligibility to the employee's spouse and children.39 Hin-
man's lover was denied coverage because he was not married to Hinman.
Hinman brought an action for declaratory relief, claiming that the
dental benefit statute denied homosexuals equal protection because it was
a "sexual orientation classification"' which discriminated against homo-
sexuals: California forbade him from marrying his cohabiting lover be-
cause they were both men, while the state denied benefits to his would-be
spouse because they were not married. Hinman asserted that homosex-
ual cohabitors are similar to married couples and should be treated
32. An estate by the entirety is a "[t]ype of joint estate which may be held only by two
persons who are married to each other at the time that the estate is created ...." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 492 (5th ed. 1979).
33. Community property is "[p]roperty owned in common by husband and wife each hav-
ing an undivided one-half interest by reason of their marital status. The eight states with
community property systems are: Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Wash-
ington, Idaho and Nevada ...." Id. at 254.
34. See, e.g., Hinman v. Dep't of Personnel, 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1985).
35. Id.
36. Specifically, the couple in Hinman was attempting to obtain the property rights in
employment benefits afforded to other state employees' spouses.
37. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 512, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
38. State Employees' Dental Care Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 22950-22952 (West 1980).
39. The Act itself does not define "spouse" or "child;" the definitions are set forth in the
Health Care Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 22751-22860 (West 1961), which defines "family
member" as "an employee's or annuitant's spouse and any unmarried child (including an
adopted child, a step child, or a recognized natural child .... )"
40. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 519, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411. A sexual orientation classifi-
cation exists when a law classifies people according to their sexual orientation, and then treats
the classes differently. Id. See also Rivera, supra note 5; Adamany, The Supreme Court at the
Frontier of Politics: The Issue of Gay Rights, 4 HAMLINE L. REV. 185, 221 (1981).
Hinman's argument rested on the proposition that a "seemingly neutral statute which
actually disqualifies a disproportionate number of one [group] is discriminatory and vulnerable
to [attack]." Boren v. Department of Employment Dev., 59 Cal. App. 3d 250, 257, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 683, 687 (1976). See generally United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886) (discrimination in the enforce-
ment or administration of a statute fair on its face is as much a denial of equal protection as the
enactment of a statute which is discriminatory in the first place); Hardy v. Stumpf, 37 Cal.
App. 3d 958, 112 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1974).
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equally under the statute: homosexual couples should be awarded the
same dental benefits as married couples receive.
Hinman's claim was denied by the trial and appellate courts.41 The
courts saw homosexual cohabitors as similarly situated to unmarried em-
ployees, not to married employees, and thus the state's denial of benefits
to Hinman's lover was not because he was homosexual, but because he
was unmarried. Furthermore, the courts asserted that legislative classifi-
cations based on marital status are not necessarily in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.42
II. Equal Protection for Homosexuals and Cohabitors
A. Purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 43
This does not require a state to treat everyone the same under its legisla-
tive schemes; rather, equal protection requires that groups similarly situ-
ated be treated equally.' Under the Equal Protection Clause, a court
first questions whether the groups classified are indeed similarly situ-
ated.4" The court then uses one of the various equal protection standards
to determine whether the clause has been violated.
B. The Various Equal Protection Standards
The Supreme Court uses at least three different equal protection
standards when examining the constitutionality of a statute:46 (1) a
41. A petition for rehearing was denied May 23, 1985, and the California Supreme Court
denied review August 15, 1985. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 531, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
42. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
43. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states
and not the federal government; however, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause incorpo-
rates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and therefore the federal govern-
ment must also provide equal protection. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
44. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Purdy &
Fitzpatrick v. California, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 578, 456 P.2d 645, 653, 90 Cal. Rptr. 77, 85 (1969);
Darcy v. Mayor of San Jose, 104 Cal. 642, 645-46, 38 P. 500, 500 (1894); Sunstein, Public
Values, Private Interests and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. Cr. REV. 127-66; Note,
Right to Marry, supra note 5, at 193.
45. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 524-25, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
46. Multi-tiered analysis has developed over the last 48 years. The use of two different
standards of equal protection was first advocated by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene
Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The third level is a product of the last
15 years, first used in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75- 77 (1971).
Multi-tiered judicial review is not unanimously supported by judges. Justice Marshall has
called three-tiered analysis a "rigidified approach to equal protection analysis." San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall prefers to balance the "constitutional and societal importance of the interest ad-
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lower tier, or rational basis analysis;47 (2) an upper tier, or strict scrutiny
analysis; 48 and (3) a middle tier, or intermediate scrutiny analysis."
1. Rational Basis Analysis
The rational basis equal protection standard is a default standard: it
is used when neither the strict scrutiny nor intermediate scrutiny analysis
is appropriate.5 0 Under the rational basis standard, to withstand judicial
scrutiny a law must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.5 I
In 1911, the Supreme Court listed four guidelines for reviewing laws
challenged under the rational basis standard:52 (1) laws carry a presump-
tion of validity;5 3 (2) they need not be mathematically precise, and some
incidental inequities will be tolerated;54 (3) courts are not bound to re-
view a law based on its legislative purpose if any reason justifies the law
as rational;55 and (4) the person challenging the statute carries the bur-
den of proving its unreasonableness. 6 The rational basis standard is
clearly balanced in favor of upholding certain statutes and
classifications.57
versely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classi-
fication is drawn." Id. at 99.
Justice Stevens has stated, "There is only one Equal Protection Clause.... It does not
direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in
other cases." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
In disapproving the development of intermediate-level review, Justice Rehnquist indicates
that judges "have had enough difficulty with the two standards of review ... so as to counsel
weightily against the insertion of still another 'standard' between those two." Id. at 220
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text; see also United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-96 (1978).
48. See infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
51. Id. at 60.
52. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
53. Because statutory classification is a uniquely legislative task, the legislature is to be
afforded broad discretion in making legal classifications: a legislative act is "presumed valid"
unless "it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary." Id. at 78.
54. A legislative classification is not unconstitutional merely "because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality." Id. (emphasis
added).
55. "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the classifica-
tion], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed." Id.
56. Id. at 78-79; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1966).
57. The vast majority of statutes tested with the rational basis test pass review, leading
one commentator to refer to it as "merely a rubber stamp review" (Notc, An Argument for the
Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality.
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 808 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Heightened Scrutiny]), while another
views it as "largely a sham as an independent standard of constitutional review ...." Simon,
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2. Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has deemed some interests as too important for
the minimal review afforded by the rational basis standard. Instead, the
courts use the upper-tier equal protection standard58 when a legislative
classification abridges a fundamental right,59 or creates a "suspect
class."6 Under strict scrutiny review, (1) the state must have a compel-
ling interest to justify the classification,6" (2) the classification is pre-
sumed invalid,62 and (3) the court will only examine the purpose of the
law as articulated at the time of enactment by the legislature.63
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: .4 Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1041, 1113 (1978).
58. In Zobel, Justice Rehnquist referred to the standard as "strict scrutiny analysis." 457
U.S. at 55, 82-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note
57:
If a classification is deemed suspect, the standard of review for any statute employing
that classification is strict scrutiny: the use of the classification must be necessary to
achieve a permissible goal of compelling importance. Further, the Court looks to
articulated purposes only, eschewing the "any conceivable basis" approach. The
Court deems classifications based on race, national origin, or, in some circumstances,
alienage suspect. Strict scrutiny is essentially a presumption that the challenged law
is invalid.
Id. at 810.
59. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37-38, explains that education is not a
fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny: "The present case ... is significantly different
from any of those cases in which the Court has applied strict scrutiny to ... legislation
touching upon Constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation
which 'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free exercise of some fundamental per-
sonal right or liberty." The Court cites as examples of fundamental rights the right of procrea-
tion, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), freedom of interstate travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 655 (1963), and the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972).
60. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 393 U.S. 618 (1969); Sail'er
Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DisTRusT 145-48 (1980); Note, Suspect Classifications: A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REv.
407 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Suspect Classifications].
For strict scrutiny applications, see, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 n.9 (1982); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 1, 11 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
61. In contrast, the state interest need merely be legitimate under rational basis review.
See Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 810; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
62. Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 810.
63. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Just as rational basis review leans heavily
in favor of upholding a given law, strict scrutiny balances in favor of striking down legislation.
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a. Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications
Fundamental rights are those rights "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty" and "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradi-
tion."64 Suspect classifications are those which treat groups disparately
on the basis of certain arbitrary characteristics. Five criteria have been
articulated by the courts to identify a suspect class:6" (1) the class has
been subjected to a history of discrimination and purposefully unequal
treatment; 66 (2) members of the class suffer from unique social stereo-
types, and bear a "badge of distinction;"'67 (3) the characteristic identify-
ing the class is immutable;68 (4) the trait is irrelevant to the group's
ability to contribute to society;6 9 and (5) the group is politically power-
less, and thus requires extraordinary judicial protection from the major-
ity.70  Presently, the Supreme Court formally recognizes only
classifications based on race and national origin or alienage as suspect for
strict scrutiny analysis.7 Although other characteristics such as indi-
gency,72 illegitimacy,73 age,74 and gender75 may meet the elements of sus-
64. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844, 2846 (1986).
65. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D.
Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
66. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. See also infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
67. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. A badge of distinction refers to a trait that is highly visible,
and thus, a ready basis for distinction, such as the color of one's skin. See also infra note 107
and accompanying text.
68. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. An immutable trait is one that is not chosen, and is not
susceptible to change, such as race. See also infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
69. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. See also infra note 112 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
71. L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1012-15; Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptual-
ization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023 (1979).
72. Many cases have recognized indigency as a special classification triggering more judi-
cial protection. For criminal statutes based on indigency which were held to be unconstitu-
tional, see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (impoverished prisoners' right to access to the
courts); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (invalidated imprisonment due to inability to pay
fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (same); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (indigent's right to counsel on appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(indigent's right to counsel in felony prosecutions); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indi-
gent's right to a transcript on appeal). For civil statutes based on indigency which were held
unconstitutional, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigent's right to divorce
despite inability to pay fee).
73. Many laws have been invalidated for their disparate treatment of illegitimate persons.
See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (invalidated state law barring illegitimate
children from inheriting from fathers); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973) (invalidated part of Social Security Act creating two classes of children: legitimate and
illegitimate); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (invalidated state law denying judicially
enforceable right of parental support of illegitimate children); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidated workmen's compensation law denying equal re-
covery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegitimate children); Glona v. American Guar.
& Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (intermediate scrutiny of wrongful death statute applied
rVol. 14:111
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pect classifications, courts have not yet given these strict scrutiny.
3. Intermediate-Level Scrutiny
Intermediate-level scrutiny7 6 is a third standard of review falling be-
tween the rational basis and strict scrutiny standards; under this stan-
dard a statutory classification must be substantially related to an
important government interest. 7 As with strict scrutiny, a court looks
only at the purposes of the law that have been articulated by the legisla-
to mother receiving benefits from illegitimate son's death); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968) (heightened scrutiny of wrongful death statute excluding illegitimate children).
74. Recent cases indicate age discrimination may trigger intermediate scrutiny. See, eg.,
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (applying middle level scru-
tiny to age classification).
75. Gender classifications are now officially afforded intermediate-level review. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (intermediate standard of review announced for sex discrimination
cases). See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (invalidated law giving husbands,
and not wives, the unilateral right to dispose of community property); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidated law denying father the right to prevent illegitimate child's
adoption); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidated law allowing alimony only for wives);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidated law that required a husband, but not a
wife, to show his financial dependency on his deceased spouse before becoming eligible for
death benefits); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (invalidated state law with different ages
of majority for males and females); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidated
part of Social Security Act paying death benefits only to widows, not to widowers); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (struck down a federal statute requiring women in the
armed forces to make a greater showing than men in the armed forces that their spouses are
dependents); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (struck down law preferring men over women
as estate administrators).
76. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court first used the intermediate equal pro-
tection standard: it requires a law to have a more substantial basis than the traditional ra-
tional basis standard of review, yet does not carry as heavy a burden as the strict scrutiny test.
See Note, Right to Marry, supra note 5, at 207 ("Middle-level scrutiny seeks to cope with the
problem that there remain rights, not now classified as 'fundamental,' that remain vital to the
flourishing of a free society, and classes, not now classified as 'suspect,' that are unfairly bur-
dened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their members.") Inter-
mediate-level scrutiny has developed because courts have found the traditional two-tiered
approach overly rigid, artificial, and outcome-determinative. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual, 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980) (the Court rejected a statute which used administrative
convenience as the sole justification for gender discrimination). Thus, a sliding scale of equal
protection review has developed for certain "semi-suspect" classes, such as illegitimacy, age.
and indigency classes. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 18-24 (1972) (middle level scrutiny is "ordinary scrutiny with a bite"); see also Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (denying heightened scrutiny to classifications of the mentally
retarded).
77. See generally Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Note, Suspect Classifications, supra note 60, at 408 (citing
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980)); Gunther, supra note 76, at 18-24. But
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ture.7 s This standard is currently applied to legislative classifications
based on gender.
III. Homosexuals and Marital Status Classifications
A. Application of Equal Protection Analysis
1. Rational Basis Analysis
The Supreme Court has never explicitly indicated the appropriate
standard of review for sexual orientation classifications.7" Courts have
usually applied the minimal demands of the lower-tier rational basis test,
under which "statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds
can be conceived to justify them."80
In the Hinman case, the trial and appellate courts agreed that the
rational basis analysis was the appropriate standard for testing the dental
benefits statute. The statute withstood constitutional challenge because it
was found to be reasonably related to a legitimate purpose: it promoted
the state interest in marriage because benefits were limited to the em-
ployee, his or her spouse, and his or her children."' All unmarried per-
sons cohabiting with the employee were ineligible for benefits; the statute
made no mention of sexual orientation. Although Hinman argued that
homosexual cohabitors are "similarly situated" to married couples, the
court of appeals did not address this argument except to conclude that
the "plaintiffs are not similarly situated to heterosexual state employees
with spouses. They are similarly situated to other unmarried state em-
ployees. Unmarried employees are all given the same benefits; plaintiffs
have not shown that unmarried homosexual employees are treated differ-
ently than unmarried heterosexual employees."82
The relationship between the statute's denial of eligibility to
cohabitors and an articulated state interest in promoting marriage was
found to be indirect but acceptable by the court of appeals: "The state
has a legitimate interest in promoting marriage .... While promoting
marriage is not one of the express purposes of the Act, it is not necessary
that the statutory scheme or policy directly promote the state interest in
see Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (sex classifications
are "suspect" and therefore strict scrutiny equal protection analysis applies).
At least three Supreme Court Justices have suggested a third element of the intermediate-
level analysis: the burden shifts to the state to justify the legislative classification. Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 490 (1981) (Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
78. Thus, the benefit of the doubt inures to the challenger, not the legislature.
79. Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 798; L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 87.
80. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'r, 393 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). See also United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1980); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938).
81. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
82. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (emphasis in original).
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marriage. [It] need only be reasonably related to that interest."83 The
court then concluded that the statute did use reasonable means to pro-
mote the legitimate state interest in marriage.84
2. Strict Scrutiny
a. Fundamental Rights
A statute abridging a fundamental right requires heightened judicial
review. So far courts have deemed few rights to be fundamental; deter-
mination of such rights may reflect traditional majoritarian precepts
more than any judicial concept of fairness.85
The discriminatory effect of marital status classifications raises two
questions: whether the right to marry is fundamental, and if so, whether
homosexuals have the right to marry.86 The availability of a homosexual
right to marry would make marital status classification challenges moot
for homosexuals. Courts have long disagreed on whether the right to
marry is fundamental. This controversy remains unresolved: the
Supreme Court "has never specifically ruled that marriage, standing
alone, is a sufficiently fundamental right to elicit use of the strict scru-
83. Id. at 527, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
84. Id. at 528, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417. The Hinman case illustrates that challenges by
homosexuals to laws such as the California statute face little or no likelihood of success if the
equal protection violation is reviewed under the undemanding rational basis test.
85. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), the Supreme Court held
that the commission of sodomy between consensual adults in private homes is not protected as
a fundamental right. The Court's reliance on traditional majoritarian morality is revealed in
the Court's reasoning:
[T]he Court has sought to identify the nature of [fundamental] rights qualifying for
heightened judicial protection. In Palko v. Connecticut (1937) it was said that this
category includes those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sac-
rificed." A different description of fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. East
Cleveland (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.), where they are characterized as those liber-
ties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." . . . [ ]It is obvi-
ous to us that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against that con-
duct have ancient roots.... Against this background, to claim that a right to engage
in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" is, at best, facetious.
Id. at 2844-46 (citations omitted).
86. The Court has already shown its reluctance to protect homosexuals when it stated
that the practice of homosexual sexual relations is not a fundamental right:
[T]here is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy....
Condemnation of [homosexual] practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral
and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman Law.
[citations omitted] .... Blackstone described "the infamous crime against nature" as
an offense of "deeper malignity" than rape, an heinous act "the very mention of
which is a disgrace to human nature," and "a crime not fit to be named."... To hold
that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right
would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.
Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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tiny standard."87 Fundamental or not, the power of the state to regulate
marriage is well-established,88 and the promotion of marriage has been
considered a compelling state interest.89
Homosexuals do not have the right to marry.9° The many challenges
to laws banning same-sex marriage have been uniformly unsuccessful,9"
despite the fact that the benefits of marriage are equally important to
homosexuals and heterosexuals. 92  A Washington state court,
87. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 5, at 578. But see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), in which the Court affirmed the importance of mar-
riage. "[Marriage is] intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty .... [I]t is
an association for as noble a purpose as any .... " Id.
88. Beeler v. Beeler, 124 Cal. App. 2d 679, 268 P.2d 1074 (1954) (the regulation of mar-
riage is solely within the province of the legislature, except as restricted by the courts); accord
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McClure ex rel. Caruthers v. Donovan, 33 Cal. 2d 717, 205 P.2d
17 (1949); Kelsey v. Miller, 203 Cal. 61, 263 P. 200 (1928); Haas v. Haas, 227 Cal. App. 2d
615, 38 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1964). For statutes regulating marriage, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4100 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986) (solemnization of marriage, and marriage licenses required);
id. at § 4101 (capacity to consent).
89. See supra note 87. However, some commentators and courts argue that the power to
regulate excludes "morality legislation:" the state can properly regulate marriage in a ration-
ally based way to fulfill a reasonable purpose, but not "based on outdated concepts of morality,
sexual stereotypes, and a misguided sense of tradition." Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of
Restrictions on the Right to Marry-Why Can't Fred Marry George-or Mary and Alice at the
Same Time?, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 33, 34 (1985). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
386 (1978): In regulating marriage, the state can impose "reasonable regulations that do not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marriage relationship.... [but only so far
as they effectuate] sufficiently important state interests." But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. at 2846, in which denial of the existence of the fundamental right to engage in private
homosexual relations was based on morality: "The law, however, is constantly based on no-
tions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Id.
90. See supra note 4.
91. One commentator has responded to the ban on same-sex marriages with a proposal
that a new institution, "quasi-marriage," be created as a substitute for marriage by
homosexuals:
The legal unions of homosexual couples would be solemnized in the same way as are
heterosexual marriages. The duly licensed homosexual couple could go to a justice of
the peace, who would be authorized by statute to perform these ceremonies, or to an
appropriate minister. Divorce proceedings for homosexuals would also be handled in
the same fashion as heterosexual divorces....
Through quasi-marital status, homosexuals could obtain the financial [and psy-
chological] benefits ... now afforded married, heterosexual couples.
Note, Right to Marry, supra note 5, at 213.
92. See Rivera, supra note 5, at 874, 908; Ingram, supra note 89, at 34:
[The human need for love is] fulfilled by intimate association with one particular
person, including the opportunity to live together, with or without a sexual relation-
ship. The law has long recognized the importance of this interest, most specifically in
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in Singer v. Hara,93 deemed heterosexual marriage a fundamental right,
but denied the right to homosexuals because it viewed the prohibition
against same-sex marriage to be a "natural consequence" of the nature of
marriage:
Although a fundamental interest may be involved, both the United
States Supreme Court and this court have recognized that not
every limitation or incidental burden on a fundamental right is
subject to the strict scrutiny standard. When the regulation merely
has an incidental effect on the exercise of protected rights, strict
scrutiny is not applied.94
The "[s]tate has the absolute right to prescribe conditions for creating
marriage relations."95 Thus, under present law, homosexuals do not
have the right to marry and marital status classifications are upheld be-
cause of the compelling state interest in promoting heterosexual
marriages.
b. Suspect Classification
In Hinman, the plaintiff argued that strict scrutiny of the California
dental benefit statute was required because it created a suspect class by
treating homosexual cohabitors differently than married persons. The
court of appeals rejected the argument: "We do not view the [statute] or
its interpretation . . . as establishing any classification on the basis of
sexual orientation, and thus, we shall not afford a strict scrutiny analysis
to this case." 96 The court declined to decide whether homosexuals con-
stitute a suspect class.
9 7
Most courts that have addressed the issue indicate that homosexuals
as a group do not qualify as a suspect class. Thus, only minimal rational
basis review is afforded sexual orientation classifications. However,
"none of the[se courts] have actually analyzed the applicability of suspect
class criteria to homosexuals." 98
the actions for loss of consortium.... [But for a homosexual,] an intimate associa-
tion with his or her chosen partner is prohibited by state law.
See also Note, Emotional Distress, supra note 5, at 994-50; Cullem, Fundamental Interests and
the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141 (1979); Note, Right to Marry, supra
note 5, at 196; Ingram, supra note 89, at 55. But see, e.g., Note, Right to Marry, supra note 5,
at 200 ("Attempts have been made to invoke strict scrutiny in the context of homosexual
marriage, but without success: Homosexuals have not been accorded suspect class status nor
has homosexual marriage been deemed a fundamental right.").
93. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
94. Id. at 262, 522 P.2d at 1196. See also McCourtney v. Cory, 123 Cal. App. 3d 431,
439, 176 Cal. Rptr. 639, 643 (1981) (citing regulations affecting the right to marry such as that
in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1979)).
95. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977).
96. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 520, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
97. Id.
98. Jones, Dronenburg v. Zech: Judicial Restraint or Judicial Prejudice?, 3 YALE L. &
POL'y REv. 245, 247 n.11 (1984). Professor Jones points out: "[C]ourts have expressed hesi-
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Homosexuals meet the first criterion of suspect classification analy-
sis: a history of discrimination.99 Historically, homosexuals have been
viewed as immoral, evil, or mentally ill;" and these views still persist
today. Homosexuals have been the victims of violent attacks as well as
housing and employment discrimination.' 01 In many states, homosexual
sexual acts are criminal1"2 and the Supreme Court has found constitu-
tional the states' power to prohibit sodomy and oral sex, even among
consenting adults in the privacy of their own bedroom. 103 The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service officially excludes aliens on the basis of
homosexuality. The military routinely practices pervasive discrimination
against homosexuals." ° Homosexuals have great difficulty in adopting
children and gaining custody of their own children. 05
tancy in recognizing the fundamental rights of homosexuals in the contexts of suspect classifi-
cation and privacy .. " Id. See also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); National Gay
Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985);
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229
(10th Cir. 1984); Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 864 (1981); Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985); Clark, Homosex-
ual Public Employees: Utilizing Section 1983 to Remedy Discrimination, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 255 (1981); Comment, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legis-
lative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979); Pearldaughter, Employment and Discrimina-
tion Against Lesbians: Municipal Ordinances and Other Remedies, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 537 (1979).
99. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
100. See Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 821-24.
101. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; BOGGAN, supra note 20, at 16-
22, 69-75; CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON PERSONAL PRIVACY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON PERSONAL PRIVACY 341-358 (1982); J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNI-
TIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970
(1983); Adamany, supra note 40; Karlen, Homosexuality in History, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAV-
IOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 75, 93-96 (J. Marmor ed. 1980); Lasson, Homosexual Rights:
The Law in Flux and Conflict, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 47 (1979); Licata, The Homosexual Rights
Movement in the United States: A Traditionally Overlooked Area of American History, J. Ho-
MOSEXUALITY 161 (Fall-Winter 1980-81).
102. Currently, 21 states and the District of Columbia have sodomy statutes. The states
are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2845.
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
104. Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the mili-
tary environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their
statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously
impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such members
adversely affects... discipline, good order, and morale[,j ... mutual trust and confi-
dence[,] ... integrity[,] ... privacy[,] ... recruit[ment] and [retention] of members[,]
* public acceptance of military service[,] and ... security.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1332.14 Encl.8 (1981). See also Heilman, The Consti-
tutionality of Discharging Homosexual Military Personnel, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
191, 193 (1980-81).
105. R. ACHTENBERG, supra note 17, at § 1.03[5][c]. See also Hitchens, Social Attitudes,
Legal Standards and Personal Trauma in Child Custody Cases, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 89, 90-
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The second suspect class factor is that the group bear a badge of
distinction, suffering from social stereotypes. 106 Many irrational stereo-
types have pervaded social and legal perceptions of homosexuals. 1°7
The third suspect class factor is that the characteristic be immuta-
ble.11 8 Homosexuality is not chosen by the individual, I0 9 and experts be-
lieve that sexual orientation is permanently fixed during the first years of
life."' Evidence of the immutability of homosexuality is supported by
the fact that a person's sexual orientation has never actually been
91 (Fall-Winter 1979-80); Rivera, Homosexuality and the Law, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 323, 328-329 (1982); Slovenko, Homosexuality
and the Law: From Condemnation to Celebration, in HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN
REAPPRAISAL, supra note 101, at 194, 214; Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in
the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 497, 523 (1984).
106. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
107. Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 821-24. See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 616. Homosexuals are thought of as "Pied Pipers"
who "proselytize children to homosexuality or present role models that make homosexuality
appear so attractive that young people will embrace it as a lifestyle." Note, Heightened Scru-
tiny, supra note 57, at 821-22 (footnote omitted). In fact, however, scientific data indicate that
"[s]exual orientation is established very early in life and cannot be consciously acquired. A
gay can no more 'convert' heterosexual children than a heterosexual can 'convert' homosexual
children." Id. at 822.
Another stereotype about homosexuals is that they are child molesters. Id. at 822-23.
This too, is unrelated to scientific reality.
The average homosexual is neither likely to be a child molester, nor more likely than
a heterosexual to be one. Indeed, with respect to physical sexual response alone [ac-
cording to laboratory-measured arousal levels], heterosexuals are more likely to be
aroused by children than are homosexuals. Finally, [statistics indicate] the typical
child molester is much more likely to be heterosexual than homosexual.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
A third commonly held stereotype about homosexuals is that they are mentally ill. Prom-
inent mental health authorities dismiss this stereotype: the National Association for Mental
Health, the American Psychiatric Association, and the Surgeon General have redefined out-
moded diagnostic categories, and "now agree that homosexuality, in and of itself, is not a
mental illness." Id. at 824.
108. Immutability means that a suspect characteristic cannot be changed or controlled.
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 28; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal.
2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
109. Research indicates that homosexuality is not an activity, but a status or an orienta-
tion. J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: THE DIFFERENTIATION
AND DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY 228 (1972).
110. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1131 n.19 (N.D. Tx. 1982) (the court explicitly
accepted the expert testimony of psychiatrist Dr. Judd Marmor, that sexual preference is prob-
ably fixed before age six); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 848-49 (D. Md.
1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (the court cited with approval the
testimony of psychologist Dr. John Money, embodied in his book MAN & WOMAN, BOY &
GIRL, supra note 109, that sexual orientation is fixed at age five or six); Note, Heightened
Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 818 n.137.
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changed. 11
The fourth suspect class factor is that the characteristic be irrelevant
to the person's ability to contribute to society. 12 Sexual orientation is
private, irrelevant to job performance, 113 and not readily apparent to the
outside world if the individual wishes to conceal his or her orientation.
Thus, it has no bearing on a person's ability to contribute to society." 4
The fifth and final factor of the analysis is that the group be politi-
cally powerless, and in need of judicial protection." 5 Homosexuals are
grossly underrepresented in government and lack substantial voting
power in nearly all areas of the country:
Most elected officials fear taking any action that would even appear
to endorse homosexuality. Beyond this impetus to do nothing, leg-
islators also face strong conservative pressure to deny gays any offi-
cial recognition or help. Gays lack sufficient clout to pressure
legislators to take pro-gay stances: gays are not only a minority,
but a substantial number conceal their homosexuality and thus are
unwilling to work for, advocate, or even be counted in favor of pro-
gay legislation." 6
Thus, homosexuality fits the five factors of a suspect classifica-
tion.'' 7 However, it evidently is not sufficient that the factors "fit" a
group: the Court also demands some extra impetus" 8 before it will ex-
111. "The researchers who have claimed 'successful' conversions [from homosexuality to
heterosexuality] have yielded no more than limited and problematical behavioral changes.
Even if behavior can be suppressed in some cases, nothing indicates that anyone can ever
change a person's orientation. No first hand record of an actual conversion of sexual orienta-
tion exists." Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 829. See generally id. at 820-21
nn.147-49; C. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 236-37, 243 (1975). Contra I. BIEBER, H.
DAIN, P. DINCE, M. DRELLICH, H. GRAND, R. GUNDLACH, M. KREMER, A. RIFKIN, C.
WILBUR & T. BIEBER, HoMOSEXUALITY: A PSYCHOANALYTICAL STUDY 318-19 (1962). For
a criticism of this work, see Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 820 n. 147.
112. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28;Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 853; Sail'er Inn, 5 Cal. 3d at 18,
485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57.
113. See generally Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57.
114. The irrelevance of sexual orientation to the ability to contribute to society is illus-
trated by evidence of generations of "closeted" homosexuals who kept their sexual orientation
a secret with no effect on their success or job performance. Id.
115. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968); Adamany, supra note 40, at 135; Jones, supra note 98,
at 254.
116. Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 826.
117. Homosexuality was given intermediate scrutiny in Rowland v. Mad River School
Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 944-46 n.17; Note, Height-
ened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 827.
118. Gender classifications also arguably fit the five factors of suspect classifications. Wo-
men have historically been discriminated against. Sex is a highly visible badge of distinction.
Gender is not chosen, and generally speaking, is not susceptible to change. Sex is irrelevant to
a woman's ability to contribute to society. Women are politically underrepresented. Despite
the possible "fit" of gender classifications into the suspect classification test, the Court has
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tend strict scrutiny review to a class. To date, the Supreme Court has
seen fit to apply strict scrutiny only to classifications based on race or
national origin.'19
3. Intermediate-Level Scrutiny
Courts have not applied strict scrutiny to statutes discriminating
against homosexuals because the right to engage in homosexual acts is
not considered a fundamental right, and because courts have not recog-
nized the suspect classification status of homosexuals. 120  Yet, rational
basis review is also inappropriate because, as a group, homosexuals meet
the five criteria of a suspect classification. The only remaining standard
of review which could reasonably be argued is the third standard of judi-
cial review, intermediate-level review, which is presently applied to gen-
der-based classifications.12 ' Under this standard, a law must be
substantially related to an important governmental interest before the
never applied strict scrutiny to gender classifications. Clearly then, some impetus beyond the
mechanical application of the test causes the Court to use the strict scrutiny analysis. See
Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57, at 827. The Note identifies three justifications
which give added impetus to a group meeting the requirements of a suspect classification: (1) a
"process" argument-heightened scrutiny is needed to correct "imbalances of power and
abuse in the political processes" because of the moral irrelevance of certain characteristics (id.
at 828); (2) an "instrumental rationality justification for the application of heightened scru-
tiny," which means that "courts should strike down an irrational law if the benefits of invalida-
tion outweigh the costs of instability, relitigation, and lack of uniformity" (id. at 833); and (3) a
"public values theory"--classification on the basis of homosexuality should be presumed to be
the result of an illegitimate motive (id. at 834).
The Supreme Court has appeared to note these justifications in its analysis of eligibility for
suspect classification. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n.4 (1982) (classification must
"reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective.... Classifications treated as suspect tend to... [relate to] certain groups [which]
have historically been relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.") In United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court noted that "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities ... tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citing Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 28).
119. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Many commentators predict that it will be
a long time, if ever, before homosexuality will be considered suspect, particularly because the
Court has refused to apply strict scrutiny protection to gender classifications. National Gay
Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1273; Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1144 n.58 (N.D. Tx. 1982);
Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 147 n.22 (N.D. Tx. 1981), aff'd mem., 669
F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982). Gender classifications concern women, who have historically suf-
fered "inequity and occasional violence," but have never been ostracized as a group from soci-
ety. Jones, supra note 98, at 255 n.48. In contrast, homosexuals, like racial classes, have faced
a "history of social ostracism, scorn, ridicule and violent treatment." Id.
120. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1986).
121. See supra note 76. The courts presently do not generally apply intermediate-level
scrutiny to homosexuals.
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classification is upheld,' 22 and courts are restricted to considering the
purposes of the statute as articulated by the legislature.
If middle-level scrutiny had been applied to the facts in Hinman, the
court of appeals could not have relied on the unarticulated justification
that the statute promoted marriage. Instead, it would have been limited
to the articulated purpose of the statute: to provide dental benefits to
state employees and their families. The state interest involved was to
provide benefits at the least cost, by limiting them to the spouse and chil-
dren of the employee himself, rather than including cohabiting lovers
and others. A court, in applying intermediate scrutiny, would decide
whether this state interest was important, and then review whether the
law was substantially related to the interest. A court would probably up-
hold the dental benefit statute under such a standard.
If intermediate-level review were extended to homosexuals, a legis-
lative classification would have to be based on sexual orientation before a
court would apply intermediate-level review. Many of the statutes chal-
lenged by homosexuals, such as the one in Hinman, do not explicitly
create sexual orientation classifications but instead create marital status
classifications,123 denying all unmarried persons benefits, regardless of
their sexual orientation.
Hinman argued that the California dental benefit statute's marital
status classification, in conjunction with the ban on same- sex marriages,
had the effect of being a sexual orientation classification which discrimi-
nated against unmarried homosexual cohabitors. 124 If a statute does not
classify on its face on the basis of a suspect class, its constitutionality
cannot be questioned unless there is evidence of a legislative motive to
treat homosexuals differently from heterosexuals because they are homo-
sexuals.125 No such motive was demonstrated in Hinman.
122. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). Some commenta-
tors have argued that intermediate-level scrutiny should be applied to equal protection chal-
lenges by homosexuals. See generally, Note, Heightened Scrutiny, supra note 57; see also Note,
Right to Marry, supra note 5, at 193 (homosexual couples involved in exclusive, long-term
relationships are similarly situated to committed heterosexual couples and middle-level judicial
scrutiny should be applied to classifications based on sexual preference).
123. See supra note 39.
124. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 519, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
125. [T]he Equal Protection Clause is not violated in the absence of a showing that
the relevant decisionmaker acted for an impermissible reason.... For Constitutional
purposes, a person . . . is not treated [unequally] if he [is denied a benefit] as an
incidental consequence of a decision that was intended to do something other than
discriminate.
Sunstein, supra note 44, at 138-39 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Person-
nel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976)).
In Hinman, the plaintiff did not argue that the marital status classification in the statute
was motivated by a desire to hurt homosexuals, but that the discriminator effect of the statute
was "seemingly neutral [but] actually disqualiflied] a disproportionate number" of homosexu-
In summary, equal protection challenges by homosexuals have been
uniformly unsuccessful. Courts refuse to afford even intermediate scru-
tiny, much less strict scrutiny review. Classifications based on homosexu-
ality have been reviewed only under the rational basis test, which affords
almost no protection. 1
26
4. The State Interest in Promoting Heterosexual Marriages
The traditional judicial view is that marriage inherently benefits the
state: "The obvious purpose of [a] marital status classification is to pro-
mote and protect the institution of marriage." '127 Courts have deemed
the promotion of marriage to be a compelling state interest.128 Two is-
sues prompted by this arrangement are: (1) whether the promotion of
such marriages is indeed a compelling or even rational state interest; and
(2) "whether the maintenance of legal distinctions based on marital sta-
tus is necessary to further that government interest."' 129
The state's promotion of marriage has disadvantages: by disallow-
ing cohabitors the legally recognizable rights of the married, courts foster
inequity in similar situations. For instance, in Hinman, the plaintiff's
als from gaining the dental benefits of their state employment. See supra note 40. However,
the law is settled that this effect, if unintended by the legislature, is not enough to hold a
classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause: there must be a "bare [legislative]...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group." United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Legislative intent is a crucial element of an equal protection violation.
Without it, courts have upheld statutes with a much stronger "incidentally discriminatory
effect" than the one in Hinman. For example, in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), a
California insurance benefits program which excluded pregnancy was held not to have a dis-
criminatory effect against women as a class:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.... [There
is no discriminatory effect] absent showing that distinctions involving pregancy are
mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against [women].
Id. at 496-97 (emphasis added).
126. There is a strong presumption of the validity of legislative balancing and decisions.
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'r, 393 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
127. Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 291. It is questionable whether marriage should be pro-
moted in light of the high divorce rate. The skyrocketing number of children raised in broken
homes is a reflection of the increasing dissatisfaction many couples have with the institution of
marriage. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPU-
LATION REPORTS, POPULATIONS CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P-20, No. 365, MARITAL STA-
TUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1980, at 4-5 (1981) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS
REPORT].
128. See Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
129. Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 291. See also Note, Denial of a Wrongful Death Action,
supra note 6: "[O]ne recent [sociological research] project reports that 63 percent of cohabitat-
ing couples marry (usually not each other) or separate within two years. This data, unexplored
in Marvin, suggests that the state need not feel compelled to legitimize cohabitation by equat-
ing it with marriage .... " Id. at 432-33 (citing Glick & Norton, Marrying, Divorcing, and
Living Together in the U.S. Today, in POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, POPULATION BUL-
LETIN (1977)).
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cohabitor was denied dental benefits that would have been awarded if
they were married. In light of the costs of the state policy promoting
heterosexual marriage, it ought to be required that the policy actually
does increase the number of marriages. There is no evidence that the
current and long-standing policy of promoting marriage by penalizing
the unmarried encourages a heterosexual to marry if he or she was not
already so inclined, and homosexual orientation will certainly not be
changed by punishing homosexual couples with same-sex marriage bans.
"[P]erpetuation of judicial rules which result in an inequitable distribu-
tion of property [or benefits] accumulated during a nonmarital relation-
ship is neither a just nor an effective way of carrying out that policy."' 30
What justifies the denial of a right for a homosexual to marry? The
most frequent justification is the state's interest in promoting procrea-
tion.13 Procreation has historically been intertwined with the concept of
marriage; avoidance of procreation is grounds for annulment of mar-
riage. 132 Courts consistently hold that marriage implies a willingness
and ability to have children, 33 because procreation is "the foundation
upon which must rest the perpetuation of society and civilization."'
' 34
Critics of the procreation justification assert that the ban on same-
sex marriages "cannot withstand the requirement of demonstrating a ra-
tional basis .... Society is not threatened by every deviation from the
norm... [but instead ought to err] on the side of tolerance and forbear-
ance." 135 Not every heterosexual marriage involves procreation, nor is
the physical ability to procreate a requirement for marriage:' 36 "The
continued assertion by courts that marriage must involve procreation
130. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. "In short, the
numerous distinctions made between non-married and married persons cannot possibily pro-
mote marriages generally." Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 292.
131. See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, supra note 5, at 78-79; Rivera, supra
note 5, at 875; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Gerwitz v. Gerwitz, 66
N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (1945); Miller v. Miller, 132 Misc. 121, 122, 228 N.Y.S. 657, 657 (1928);
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605 (1926).
132. Gerwitz, 66 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
133. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. at 81, 150 N.E. at 607; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen)
605, 610 (1862).
134. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. at 81, 150 N.E. at 607.
135. Ingram, supra note 89, at 55. "The perceived incompatibility of marriage and homo-
sexuality arises out of outmoded biases, which should not be allowed to justify denial of the
legal, financial, and social benefits of marital status." Note, Right to Marry, supra note 5, at
196.
136. "The difference in reproductive capacity is not germane to comparison of homosexual
and heterosexual marriages because courts have not regarded the ability to reproduce as part
of the definition of marriage." Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homosex-
ual Challenge, 5 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 41, 42 (1976). See also, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.
Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976) (the state court
upheld a marriage solemnized after the woman's successful sex-reassignment operation, de-
spite the fact that transsexuals are sterile).
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and heterosexual intercourse does no more than describe what is com-
mon to many marriages. [Prohibitions on marriage between homosexu-
als actually] are based on irrational prejudice and fear of unconventional
activities and lifestyles."'
137
Another justification for marital status classifications is the desire to
preserve the traditional family unit. 138 This is open to much criticism:
first, it is a value judgment which is an inappropriate basis for inflicting
marital status classification burdens onto cohabitors; second, the conven-
tional family unit has disintegrated remarkably in past decades despite
the benefits of marital status classifications.' 39 Penalizing heterosexual
and homosexual cohabitors in an effort to preserve traditional families is
arbitrary and unfair. Nontraditional families are equally deserving of ju-
dicial protection.
A third justification for marital status classifications is the state's
interest in "maintaining its exclusive franchise power over the marriage
institution and the ceremonial requirements with respect thereto, in that
the state is thereby provided with a central registry of valuable
records. ' '" 4" This interest is certainly not a justifiable reason to discrimi-
nate against cohabitors' rights. Such records could be gathered in ways
much less intrusive on the choice to marry,14 1 and the state interest is of
minimal import when balanced against the fundamental inequity it
fosters.
The state's interest in preventing the spread of disease is a fourth
justification for the prohibition of homosexual marriages,'42 but the logic
of this rationale is questionable. The promotion of marriage among
homosexuals ought to increase homosexual monogamy. The promiscuity
now legally justified by the ban on same-sex marriages is much more
137. Ingram, supra note 89, at 55.
138. However, studies show that cohabitation mimics the traditional family form. See
Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125,
1128-37 (1981) ("Many cohabitation arrangements closely resemble the traditional family
unit"); Note, Emotional Distress, supra note 5, at 939 ("studies... indicate that these [unmar-
ried] couples exhibit economic behavior generally associated with married persons").
The traditional family form is increasingly unusual, due largely to the increase in di-
vorces. See U.S. CENSus REPORT, supra note 127, at 2 (marked increase has occurred in the
rate of divorce in the United States. Since 1970, the divorce rate has climbed from 47 to 100
divorced persons per 1,000 married persons). Given the increase in cohabitation and divorce
as well as other social changes since the 1960's, a narrow interpretation of the family unit
would not reflect the realities of contemporary society. Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 293.
139. There are record numbers of working women, single-parent households, and "latch-
key" children. See U.S. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 127.
140. Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 292.
141. Traditional census taking provides adequate records.
142. Note, Constitutional Law-Family Law-Right to Marry Deemed Fundamental
Right, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 682, 700.
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likely to spread disease than if homosexual marriages were allowed.143
The fifth justification for marital status classifications is the preser-
vation of the majoritarian moral scheme. Courts and legislatures often
reflect majoritarian societal values, and may view unconventional family
environments as undesirable. However, the preservation of the tradi-
tional nuclear family, consisting of a working father and a mother in the
home caring for the children, is an improper basis for a legislative classi-
fication because it is neither intrinsically superior nor attainable in to-
day's social patterns. Yet, both heterosexual cohabitation and
homosexuality have been widely perceived as immoral1" and this per-
spective continues to permeate the legal system. In contrast, this percep-
tion is not shared by the millions of Americans who are heterosexual
cohabitors145 or homosexuals. 146
Thus the state's interest in promoting heterosexual marriage and
preventing homosexual marriage has little, if any, logical support, and
such an interest should not be considered legitimate, let alone compel-
ling, in light of the substantial inequities it produces.
B. Marital Status Classifications
Many laws discriminating against homosexuals classify by marital
status rather than sexual orientation. These laws provide homosexual
cohabitors with a new alternative to traditional equal protection chal-
lenges in order to gain access to government entitlements. Instead, the
143. In light of the current Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic, this
interest becomes increasingly compelling. See Burda & Powells, AIDS: A Time Bomb at Hospi-
tals' Doors, J. AMER. HosP. Assoc., Jan. 5, 1986, at 54(b).
144. Both have been proscribed as criminal. See supra note 102 and infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
145. The incidence of cohabitation increased 800% between 1960 and 1970. Ledger v.
Tippett, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 631, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 816 (1985). The U.S. Census Bureau
reported that the number of persons of opposite sex who share living quarters doubled to 1.3
million between 1970 and 1976. Schwartz, Living Together, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1977, at 46.
By 1980, approximately 3,120,000 individuals were living together, a 200% increase from
1970. U.S. CENSUS REPORT, supra note 127, at 4-5. This data indicates that a substantial
number of people do not find cohabitation immoral. A court decision should not be based on
the court's disapproval of the moral choices involved:
As our state [California] Supreme Court has explicitly recognized, non-marital rela-
tionships are pervasive in current society, and mores in regard to cohabitation have
changed radically, so that courts "cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral
considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many." More-
over, such conduct has been held to be within the penumbra of constitutional protec-
tion afforded the rights of privacy ... so that intrusion by the state in this sensitive
area is not a matter to be undertaken lightly.
In re Marriage of Wellman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 992, 998, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148, 152 (1980) (citing
Marvin v. Marvin 18 Cal. 3d 600, 557 P.2d 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1976)).
146. Estimates in 1977 placed the number of homosexuals in the United States at about 19
million. See Rivera, supra note 5, at 800 n.4. The number of homosexuals grows with the
general population. Id.
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validity of the marital status test as the sole test of legal significance can
be questioned. Traditionally, unmarried persons were viewed as not hav-
ing a relationship of sufficient importance to warrant the special protec-
tions and privileges afforded to those who underwent the pledge of legal
significance: marriage.147 It is no longer as certain whether marital sta-
tus has retained its traditional importance as a distinguishing factor be-
tween a casual and significant relationship, and whether marriage should
be a prerequisite before certain relationships are afforded legal
protection.
The growing doubts about the validity of the marital status test
spring from the tremendous surge of persons living together in significant
relationships without marriage. Cohabitation has become a modem so-
cial phenomenon, mirroring the "sexual revolution" of the 1960's. While
cohabitation was once a crime,148 the number of cohabitors has increased
tenfold between 1960 and 1980,149 an indication of increasing social ac-
ceptance. The growing acceptance of heterosexual cohabitation parallels
the increased acceptance of homosexuals,15 who were once viewed as
immoral but are now increasingly tolerated. 5'
Just as homosexuals have been waging legal efforts to gain protec-
tion of their relationships, so have heterosexual cohabitors been flung
into legal disputes over the implications of their relationships. A prevail-
ing issue today is whether greater legal protection should be extended to
persons who are homosexuals or cohabitors, or both. As cohabitation
has increased, so have the legal disputes between cohabitors, and thus the
judiciary has been forced to accommodate their needs. In Marvin v.
Marvin,15 2 a couple began cohabiting after the plaintiff, Michelle Marvin,
agreed to give up her career and take responsibility for their household in
exchange for an express promise by Lee Marvin that he would financially
support her for the rest of her life. The parties separated after seven
years of cohabitation, and after the promised support ceased, Ms. Marvin
sued for breach of contract. The California Supreme Court found that
Ms. Marvin stated a cause of action for breach of contract.153
The decision showed that cohabitors and nonmarital relationships
will be afforded legal protections despite the couple's unmarried sta-
tus. 154 Cohabitors, like the parties to any agreement, can have reason-
147. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
148. Criminal sanctions have been removed from cohabitation in California, as well as in
many other states. CAL. PENAL CODE § 269(a) (West 1979).
149. See supra note 145.
150. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
153. Id. at 684-85, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
154. "Marvin v. Marvin, by recognizing and enabling enforcement of certain property
rights of unmarried cohabitants, signaled the development of judicial remedies for persons
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able expectations and "[t]he legal system of a society which now accepts
nonmarital cohabitation must protect the reasonable expectations of
those persons choosing this alternative lifestyle." '55 Courts and legisla-
tures ought to be guided not by moral judgments, but by the reasonable
expectations of the parties, which can provide workable guidelines for
cohabitors' disputes.
15 6
After Marvin, it is reasonable for an unmarried person to expect
judicial protection of rights springing from his or her cohabiting relation-
ship, if such relationship carries legal significance. Prior to Marvin, the
gauge used to measure a relationship's legal significance was marriage,
and once solemnized, the reasonable expectations of the married couple
became fully enforceable. But now marital status is no longer the defini-
tive statement of a relationship's seriousness: marital status is merely a
traditional and convenient test for defining a legally significant relation-
ship, and not a substantive requirement. It is simply one of many possi-
ble tests for determining whether a relationship is deserving of legal
protection. This judicial trend toward deemphasizing marital status as
the sole measure of a relationship's significance carries important impli-
cations for both heterosexual and homosexual cohabitors.' 57
Marvin lays out an analytical framework which views cohabitors'
rights contractually, and which is equally applicable to homosexual
cohabitors. "Marvin specifically directs trial judges to examine the con-
duct of the parties to a relationship, in the absence of express agreements,
in order to determine their respective rights and reasonable expecta-
living in nonmarital relationships." R. ACHTENBERG, supra note 17, at § 3.0412][a][i] (foot-
note omitted).
155. Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 284-85. Marvin Mitchelson, the plaintiff's attorney,
wrote: "The essence of Marvin is that relief will be provided in as equitable a manner as the
facts of each case warrant." Id. at 284. It would be logically consistent to enforce homosexu-
als' reasonable expectations as well as heterosexuals'. "Since the court in Marvin based its
decision on contract law,... its principles will apply to lesbians and gay males as well as to
heterosexual couples." R. ACHTENBERG, supra note 17, at § 3.04[2][a][i].
156. The expectations of two people who decide to live together, though [unmarried],
are nevertheless based upon certain elements of marriage that are implicit in any
situation in which lovers engage each other to share their lives togther. Namely,
there are [reasonable] expectations of mutual support, companionship and enjoyment
of the fruits of labor that come out of the relationship.
Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 285 n.8 (emphasis added).
157. Traditional notions of the family unit and lingering prejudice against homosexu-
als, however, have hampered legal reform .... [Many homosexual] couples form
stable and significant cohabitation arrangements which serve the same function as a
spousal relationship.... [T]he arguments in favor of extending [benefits] to unmar-
ried heterosexual cohabitants also should be applicable to homosexual cohabitants
Note, Emotional Distress, supra note 5, at 949-50. "'Marvin ... redefined the rights of unmar-
ried cohabitants with regard to financial interests in property. The decision did not necessarily
limit these property rights to unmarried heterosexual couples." Id. at 950-51.
tions." I58 Marvin has been applied by at least one lower California court
to homosexual cohabitors. 1
59
IV. Proposal for a New Legal Significance Test
If marital status was not the sole legal test of a relationship's signifi-
cance, what other tests may be employed? In Butcher v. Superior
Court,160 a California court laid out an alternative to marital status as a
test of the legal significance of a relationship: "The relationship must be
both stable and significant. If the plaintiff can show that the relationship
meets both of these criteria, then he or she will have demonstrated the
parallel to the marital relationship .... "161
Once alternative tests are used to replace marital status as the trig-
ger for a relationship deserving legal protection, and the reasonable ex-
pectations of parties to a nonmarital relationship are taken into account,
then there is no further bar to the enforcement of rights, including em-
ployment benefits, for heterosexual or homosexual cohabitors.
Marital status is not the only way to demonstrate the stability and
significance of a relationship; in fact, the relative ease and frequency of
marital dissolutions makes it debatable whether marital status is a proper
indication of stability or significance.162 The relationship itself should be
scrutinized for certain elements indicative of stability and significance. 163
Evidence of the stability and significance of the relationship could
be demonstrated by [six factors:] [1] the duration of the relation-
ship; [2] whether the parties have a mutual contract; [3] the degree
of economic cooperation and entanglement; [4] exclusivity of sex-
ual relations; [5] whether there is a "family" relationship ... [; and
6] those characteristics of significance which one may expect to
find in what is essentially a de facto marriage." 4
158. Mitchelson, supra note 5, at 300.
159. Following the Marvin lead, a subsequent San Diego superior court [in Richard-
son v. Conley] recognized the relationship of two lesbians as sufficiently legitimate to
require one of the women to pay support to the other when the relationship ended.
The trial judge based the holding on the fact that two women participated in a [mar-
riage-like] ...ceremony ...and had signed an agreement that one would take
responsibility for the household and the other for financial support.
Note, Emotional Distress, supra note 5, at 951 (citing the unpublished case Richardson v. Con-
ley, decided June 6, 1978 (discussed in THE ADVOCATE, No. 245 at 12 (July 12, 1978))).
160. 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983).
161. Id. at 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (emphasis added).
162. See supra note 138.
163. "[T]he mere fact that a couple [is unmarried] cannot serve as a basis for a court's
inference that the couple intend [sic] to keep their earnings and property separate and in-
dependent; the parties' intention can only be ascertained by a more searching inquiry into the
nature of their relationship." Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 676 n.11, 557 P.2d at 117 n.l 1. 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 826 n.1l.
164. Butcher, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 70. 188 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
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While these six factors are not exclusive, they establish a standard for
evaluating relationships.
Application of the Butcher factors to Hinman shows that the test,
though less precise than marital status, is workable.165 In Hinman, the
duration of the relationship was over twelve years at the time of the filing
of the lawsuit. The parties had entered into contracts together and had
covenants of mutual support. Their joint bank account and the co-own-
ership of their home indicated commingling of funds and financial entan-
glement. Their relationship was monogamous, and the two desired to
marry. The couple's dependency and commitment to one another are
evident in the fact that the two men were each other's beneficiaries in
their respective life insurance policies and wills. The elements of stability
and significance are demonstrable by the objective facts of the
relationship.
While the "stable and significant" test may appear to be a marked
departure from currently used legal approaches, courts have already
been willing to look beyond the unconventional sexual orientation of the
parties and allow reasonable expectations to guide the award of benefits.
In Donovan v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,166 a 1982 Califor-
nia case before the court of appeals, the homosexual cohabitor of a state
employee made a claim for the employee's death benefits. Donovan
claimed to be the cohabitor of Finnerty. Upon Finnerty's death, his de-
pendents were eligible for death benefits from his government employ-
ment; the only dependent was Donovan. Under the applicable statutory
language, eligible dependents included Finnerty's "family" and members
of his "household"-there was no marital status restriction. The court
reversed the denial of benefits to Donovan because the trial court had
"purposefully avoided" finding Donovan a dependent when "confronted
with the problem of an alleged homosexual live-in partner as claim-
ant."' 67 On remand, the lower court found Donovan qualified as Fin-
nerty's "family," and awarded him $25,000 in death benefits.
When a court is faced with a marriage-like relationship between
homosexuals, and eligibility for benefits does depend on a statutory mari-
165. Such a test would inevitably be intrusive, but it would be a voluntary invasion of
privacy. Currently, with marital status as the only test, cohabitors have no means to enforce
their rights. With an alternative test, cohabitors could choose to voluntarily bring their rela-
tionship within judicial examination and evaluation. If an unmarried couple did not desire
potential legal protection of their rights, they would not have to come forward and subject
their relationship to the judicial intrusion that must necessarily accompanN a Butcher-type test.
But for a couple seeking legal benefits, that option should be made available. But cf. Ledger,
164 Cal. App. 3d at 635-36, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (female cohabitant has no cause of action for
loss of consortium upon male cohabitant's death); Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 527, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 417 (denial of death benefits to unmarried partners of state employees is not discrimi-
natory against homosexual employees).
166. 138 Cal. App. 3d 323, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982).
167. Id. at 328-29, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
tal status classification, as in Hinman, the court should apply the Butcher
"stable and significant" test rather than the marital status test. In Hin-
man, this would have made the plaintiff's cohabitating lover eligible for
benefits.
If the Butcher test is implemented, marital status need not be cast
aside. It remains as a decisive factor in the evaluation of the relationship.
As Justice Broussard of the California Supreme Court has explained:
The state [need not] equate marriage and nonmarital relationships
in determining rights to [benefits. It would be proper to] invoke a
presumption [that the requirements are satisfied when the claim-
ants are married] without granting a like presumption for persons
in nonmarital relationships. But the presumption in favor of mar-
riage should not lead us to refuse to recognize that there exist
close, enduring, and significant nonmarital relationships, that such
relationships may give rise to moral and (under Marvin) legal obli-
gations, and that in a particular case [the parallel of marriage can
be established].' 68
A Butcher-type legal significance test should be substituted for the
current marital status test to determine whether legal protection shall be
afforded a relationship. Once such a test is used by the legislature and
judiciary, homosexuals as well as heterosexuals would be equally able to
make a showing of legal significance, and thus gain the benefits, protec-
tions, and privileges currently reserved for married heterosexuals.
Conclusion
Equal protection challenges to statutes discriminating against homo-
sexuals have had little success. Courts have refused to view homosexual
couples as "similarly situated" to heterosexual married couples, homo-
sexuals do not have a fundamental right to marry, and homosexuality is
not considered a suspect classification by the judiciary.
Adult adoptions, used by homosexual cohabitors to gain legal recog-
nition and protection for their families, provide homosexuals with only
limited benefits. Marital status classifications prevent homosexuals from
gaining the full legal rights which heterosexuals enjoy. A new approach
is needed to evaluate relationships and provide legal protections to those
who fail to fit the conventional family mold. Courts should evaluate the
significance of a relationship by measuring its stability and significance.
Marital status should constitute a presumption of legal significance in a
relationship, but should not be the only measure of the significance of the
relationship.
Cohabitors, whether heterosexual or homosexual, share the same in-
jury from marital status classifications. A new legal measure of a rela-
168. Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 16, 663 P.2d 904, 915, 192
Cal. Rptr. 134, 145 (1983) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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tionship's significance would offer equal protection to all persons,
regardless of their conformity with traditional sexual conventions, and
would reflect increased social tolerance for a multitude of lifestyles. Such
social diversity can flourish only through judicial and legislative ac-
knowledgement of the reasonable expectations of heterosexual and ho-
mosexual cohabitors.
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